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OPINION 
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SMITH, Chief Judge.   
 
Ravidath Ragbir, a green card holder from Trinidad and 
Tobago, was convicted of mortgage fraud in 2000.  Because 
the loss attributable to the fraud exceeds $10,000, the 
Department of Homeland Security seeks to remove Ragbir to 
his native country.  To avoid the immigration consequences 
collateral to his conviction, Ragbir filed a petition for a writ of 
error coram nobis, seeking either a new trial or resentencing.  
Because Ragbir fails to meet the requirements for issuance of 
the writ, we will affirm the District Court’s denial of the 
petition. 
I 
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A. District of New Jersey Felony Conviction 
Ragbir came to the United States as a lawful permanent 
resident in 1994, and by the late 1990s, he worked in sales at 
Household Finance Corporation (“HFC”).  At HFC, Ragbir 
was responsible for soliciting mortgage applications, 
conducting initial reviews, and referring appropriate 
applications to the company’s underwriter.  A real estate 
broker going by the name of Robert Taylor—whose actual 
name was Robert Kosch—recruited individuals to submit 
fraudulent mortgage applications, which Ragbir preliminarily 
approved.  After HFC had disbursed large sums of money, 
company investigators and the police began questioning 
various employees, including Ragbir, about the fraudulent 
applications. 
Ragbir and four others were eventually indicted on six 
counts of wire fraud and one count of conspiracy to commit 
wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 1343.  The indictment 
alleged that Ragbir accepted and preliminarily approved 
fraudulent applications from individuals that Kosch hired to 
pose as loan applicants.  Attorney Patricia Lee represented 
Ragbir in the criminal proceedings, and before trial, he raised 
with her his concerns about the immigration consequences of 
a conviction.  Attorney Lee advised Ragbir that a conviction 
could result in deportation, but Ragbir mistakenly gathered that 
a conviction alone would make him deportable. 
At his November 2000 trial, the government presented 
Ragbir’s confession to the police.  Although defense counsel 
challenged the accuracy of the transcribed confession, the jury 
found Ragbir guilty on all counts.  The jury was not required, 
however, to make a loss determination, so that issue was 
addressed at sentencing.  Defense counsel and the government 
vigorously disputed the dollar figure, but the two sides 
eventually reached an agreement that the actual loss was 
between $350,000 and $500,000.1  Attorney Lee counseled 
                                                 
1 The government’s initial loss calculation was over $1 million, 
which Attorney Lee challenged in various ways: she objected 
to the draft presentence report; looked for analysis of title 
searches, appraisals, deeds, defects in title, and whether HFC 
could recover the properties; attempted to persuade the 
government that the loss calculation should exclude bargained-
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Ragbir to waive his right to a hearing at which the prosecution 
and the defense could present evidence about what sentence is 
appropriate and to stipulate to the agreed-upon range.  Ragbir 
agreed to the stipulation, believing that his convictions alone 
made him deportable; the amount of loss, in his view, was 
irrelevant.2  The District Court adopted the stipulation, 
sentencing Ragbir to thirty months’ imprisonment, three years’ 
supervised release, and $350,001 in restitution. 
Ragbir appealed, and the service of his sentence was 
delayed pending the appeal.  Ragbir’s appellate counsel, 
Anthony Fusco, asserted a variety of claims—among them, 
that Ragbir’s confession was involuntary and the evidence at 
trial was insufficient to find Ragbir guilty.  This Court affirmed 
Ragbir’s convictions and sentence, United States v. Ragbir, 38 
                                                 
for interest; and opposed HFC’s efforts to increase the loss 
amount by including investigation fees and costs of potential 
foreclosures.  After several months of negotiations, the parties 
agreed that only HFC’s actual loss—the shortfall after 
accounting for payments and collateral—could count for 
purposes of sentencing.   
Of the eighteen transactions involved in this case, 
Ragbir asserts that only eight loans, five indicted and three 
unindicted, can be properly attributed to him.  HFC had 
disbursed $557,697.31 on these eight loans.  But it may have 
had no enforceable security interest in certain properties 
pledged as collateral.  For example, the nominal borrowers for 
three of the fraudulent disbursements never authorized the 
loans taken out in their names.  HFC disbursed approximately 
$290,000 for these three loans, and the record shows that it 
recovered only $7,250.  Moreover, one loan was based on a 
forged deed, so HFC could not foreclose on the mortgaged 
property to recover its $103,000 expenditure.   
Despite defense counsel’s efforts, the government 
sought a dollar loss exceeding $800,000.  It took considerable 
negotiation before the government agreed to a stipulation of 
around $350,000, and the trial court stated that there was no 
doubt the loss could exceed that amount.  Looking solely at the 
five indicted loans, the District Court concluded that the actual 
loss was $426,048.03. 
2 A crime of fraud or deceit causing a loss exceeding $10,000 
may qualify as an aggravated felony, triggering potential 
immigration consequences.   8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i). 
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F. App’x 788 (3d Cir. 2002), and the United States Supreme 
Court denied certiorari.  Ragbir v. United States, 537 U.S. 1089 
(2002).  Ragbir never sought relief under § 2255. 
Ragbir began serving his sentence in February 2004.  
While imprisoned, he consulted with a lawyer about seeking 
post-conviction relief but was told that nothing could be done.  
Ragbir’s supervised release began in May 2006 and concluded 
on May 22, 2009.   
B. Immigration Related Proceedings 
Upon completion of his prison sentence in May 2006, 
Ragbir was placed in immigration custody while the 
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) commenced 
removal proceedings.  It was during those proceedings that 
Ragbir learned that his stipulation to a loss of more than 
$10,000, rather than his convictions themselves, was what 
made him deportable.  Ragbir’s immigration counsel, David 
Kim, recognized the significance of the loss stipulation and 
represented to the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) that a criminal 
defense attorney would be hired to attempt to vacate the 
underlying convictions.  Despite this representation, Ragbir did 
not pursue a collateral attack.  On August 7, 2006, the IJ held 
that Ragbir’s convictions constituted aggravated felonies and 
ordered him removed from the United States.   
On review, the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) 
affirmed the IJ’s order.  Ragbir sought review of the decision, 
and in February 2008, DHS placed Ragbir on supervised 
release pending resolution of his petition.  The Second Circuit 
upheld the BIA’s decision in 2010, Ragbir v. Holder, 389 F. 
App’x 80 (2d Cir. 2010), and the Supreme Court denied 
certiorari.  Ragbir v. Holder, 565 U.S. 816 (2011). 
Later that year, Ragbir married an American citizen.  
Together, they applied for an immigrant visa based on their 
marriage and received approval in November 2011.  The 
following month, DHS granted Ragbir a stay of removal.  
Ragbir filed a motion to reopen the proceedings before the BIA 
based on his having an immigrant visa and the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358 
(2010) (narrowing honest services fraud).  On May 15, 2012, 
the BIA denied the motion, stating that the issues surrounding 
Ragbir’s conviction were properly the subject of the federal 
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courts.  Ragbir filed a petition for review which was 
unsuccessful.  Ragbir v. Lynch, 640 F. App’x 105 (2d Cir. 
2016). 
DHS eventually elected not to renew its discretionary 
stay of removal, and on January 11, 2018, Ragbir was taken 
into immigration custody.  Ragbir then challenged his 
detention under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in the United States District 
Court for the Southern District of New York, which granted his 
habeas petition and ordered him released.  Ragbir v. Sessions, 
No. 18-cv-236, 2018 WL 623557 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2018).  
On March 23, 2018, the United States District Court for the 
District of New Jersey entered a stay of removal.  The Second 
Circuit likewise stayed removal.  See Ragbir v. Homan, 923 
F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 2019). 
C. Coram Nobis Proceedings 
After the BIA denied Ragbir’s motion to reopen the 
proceedings in May 2012, he filed a petition seeking a writ of 
error coram nobis in the United States District Court for the 
District of New Jersey on November 30, 2012.  In that petition, 
Ragbir asserted that his conviction should be overturned 
because jury instructions given at his trial were erroneous in 
light of later Supreme Court rulings—Skilling (2010) 
(narrowing honest-services fraud) and Global-Tech 
Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754 (2011) (clarifying 
willful blindness).  He also claimed ineffective assistance of 
counsel based on Attorney Lee’s (1) failure to explain that the 
loss attributed to his conviction would have immigration 
consequences and (2) advice to forego a sentencing hearing.  
Ragbir and the government decided to work toward an 
amicable settlement.  Aware of these efforts, the District Court 
administratively terminated the matter without prejudice on 
May 30, 2013. 
The parties’ negotiations failed.  That led Ragbir to file 
an amended coram nobis petition in February 2015.  This 
amended petition included three new allegations: trial counsel 
was ineffective because she failed to (1) sufficiently 
investigate and negotiate the loss amount and (2) retain a 
linguistics expert to challenge the authenticity of Ragbir’s 
confession, and appellate counsel was ineffective because he 
(3) failed to assert that the willful blindness jury instruction 
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was erroneous.  Based on further discussions, the parties 
submitted a joint stipulation to voluntarily dismiss the action 
without prejudice pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) to 
allow Ragbir to pursue a presidential pardon.  The District 
Court granted the agreed-upon relief on March 3, 2016. 
Like the settlement talks, Ragbir’s attempt to secure a 
pardon was unsuccessful.  He renewed his coram nobis petition 
on February 22, 2017.  After briefing concluded, the District 
Court held an evidentiary hearing on May 4, 2018 and denied 
coram nobis on January 25, 2019.  Five days later, Ragbir filed 
this appeal.  Ragbir asked the District Court to stay the IJ’s 
removal order pending the disposition of this appeal.  The 
District Court denied the request, but it extended an earlier 
stay, thereby allowing Ragbir to make an emergency 
application to this Court.  We denied the emergency stay 
application because Ragbir failed to show that he was likely to 
succeed on the merits.  Nonetheless, the Second Circuit stay 
remains in effect.  See Ragbir v. Homan, 923 F.3d 53. 
On appeal, Ragbir asserts that the District Court erred 
in denying his petition for a writ of error coram nobis.  He 
claims, inter alia, (1) ineffective assistance of trial counsel due 
to affirmative misadvice on the immigration consequences of 
stipulating to a deportable loss amount; (2) ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel for failure to investigate, negotiate, 
and properly calculate the attributable loss; (3) ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel for not introducing expert testimony; 
(4) an erroneous willful blindness jury instruction permitted 
the finder of fact to convict Ragbir of non-criminal conduct; 
and (5) the “scheme or artifice to defraud” jury instruction, 
which Ragbir characterizes as “dishonesty type language,” was 
unconstitutionally vague, allowing the jury to inappropriately 
convict him based on lawful activity.      
II 
This Court has jurisdiction to review the District 
Court’s denial of coram nobis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
Based on the standards articulated in United States v. Orocio, 
legal questions receive de novo review while clear error review 
applies to factual findings.  645 F.3d 630, 635 (3d Cir. 2011), 
abrogated on other grounds by Chaidez v. United States, 568 
U.S. 342 (2013). 
III 
8 
 
 At common law, appeals were not always a matter of 
right.3  A factual error that was unknown at the time of trial 
and that would have resulted in a different outcome did not 
give rise to a remedy until the mid-sixteenth century.4  By 
then,5 the judiciary had fashioned the writs of quae coram 
nobis resident (“let the record remain before us”) and quae 
coram vobis resident (“let the record remain before you”),6 
which were intended to correct the occasional injustice 
stemming from factual errors in the Court of King’s Bench and 
the Court of Common Pleas, respectively.7 
 Coram nobis was seldom used, despite its availability in 
both civil and criminal cases.8  Such rare invocation of the writ 
resulted, in part, from the requirement that the challenged 
judgment be erroneous in fact and not in law.9  Moreover, only 
                                                 
3 ELI FRANK, CORAM NOBIS: COMMON LAW, FEDERAL, 
STATUTORY, WITH FORMS 1 (1953). 
4 Stanley H. Fuld, The Writ of Error Coram Nobis, 117 N.Y. 
L.J., June 5, 1947, at 2212. 
5 Just how coram nobis came to be is unclear.  See id. (noting 
a 1553 reference in FitzHerbert’s Natura Brevium). 
6 “The writs of error coram nobis and error coram vobis 
differed from ordinary common law writs of error. An ordinary 
writ of error removed a judgment from an inferior court to a 
superior one for review and correction of errors of law or fact. 
Coram nobis and coram vobis, in contrast, directed the court 
that rendered the judgment to correct its own error.” Brendan 
W. Randall, United States v. Cooper: The Writ of Error Coram 
Nobis and the Morgan Footnote Paradox, 74 MINN. L. REV. 
1063, 1066 n.20 (1990); see also W.W. Thorton, Coram Nobis 
Et Coram Vobis, 5 IND. L.J. 603, 605 (1930). 
7 “The English common law distinction between coram nobis 
and coram vobis reflects the procedural nature of the English 
judicial system as opposed to the substantive nature of the 
writs. Most American courts have shown little concern for this 
technical distinction and have used the terms interchangeably.”  
Randall, supra note 6, at 1067 n.22; see also Abraham L. 
Freedman, The Writ of Error Coram Nobis, 3 TEMP. L. Q. 365, 
367-68 (1929).  Freedman was a member of this Court from 
1964 through 1971. 
8 See Freedman, supra note 7, at 374; Randall, supra note 6, at 
1066. 
9 FRANK, supra note 3, at 3. 
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“certain facts which affect[ed] the validity and regularity of the 
legal decision itself” justified issuance of the writ.10  By the 
nineteenth century, the writ of error coram nobis “was hoary 
with age and even obsolete.”11  Blackstone makes no mention 
of it in his Commentaries,12 and Holdsworth devotes 
approximately five lines to the subject.13  American courts, 
however, breathed new life into this “hoary” writ. 
 Coram nobis migrated to the United States with the 
common law, but it developed a more expansive reach than in 
England.14  Although the writ was still available for correcting 
factual errors that lie outside the record—in both federal and 
state courts as well as both civil and criminal matters—many 
courts imported new grounds from equity.15  Still, the writ’s 
utility diminished over time.  Other remedies, such as a motion 
for a new trial or habeas corpus, supplanted it.16  Some states 
abandoned coram nobis altogether through statutory schemes 
                                                 
10 Freedman, supra note 7, at 367.  Examples include coverture 
and the death of a party before judgment.  See id. at 390-92. 
11 Anderson v. Buchanan, 168 S.W.2d 48, 55 (Ky. 1943). 
12 See 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *406 
(Thomas M. Cooley ed., 3rd ed. 1884); see also Pickett’s Heirs 
v. Legerwood, 32 U.S. 144, 147 (1833); Fuld, supra note 4; 
Morgan Prickett, The Writ of Error Coram Nobis in California, 
30 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1, 6 n.18 (1990). 
13 See 1 WILLIAM SEARLE HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF 
ENGLISH LAW 224 (3d ed. 1922). 
14 See Daniel F. Piar, Using Coram Nobis to Attack Wrongful 
Convictions: A New Look at an Ancient Writ, 30 N. KY. L. REV. 
505, 507 (2003).  
15 See, e.g., Sanders v. State, 85 Ind. 318 (1882); see also Fuld, 
supra note 4; Piar, supra note 14. 
16 See Piar, supra note 14, at 508-09. 
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for post-conviction litigation,17 and the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure expressly abolished it in 1948.18 
 As the scope of coram nobis narrowed, some began to 
question its continued applicability to criminal convictions in 
federal courts.  The Supreme Court reserved judgment on the 
issue,19 and over time, the courts of appeals became divided.20  
The 1946 promulgation of Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, allowing a district court to correct an 
illegal sentence at any time, and the enactment of 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2255 in 1948 further undermined the usefulness of coram 
nobis.21 
The writ of error coram nobis was moribund—at least 
in the federal courts—until the Supreme Court revived and 
refashioned it in 1954.  See United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 
502 (1954).  In Morgan, the Court held that (1) Rule 60(b) did 
not abolish coram nobis in criminal contexts, (2) Rule 35 did 
not render the writ unnecessary, and (3) section 2255 did not 
replace coram nobis.  Id. at 505 n.4, 505-06, 510-11.  Instead, 
the Supreme Court stated that the continuing vitality of coram 
nobis was grounded in the All Writs Act of 1789.  Id. at 506.  
The Court also broadened the scope of coram nobis relief 
beyond that of curing factual errors: the writ’s function was to 
correct errors of the most “fundamental character.”  Id. at 511-
12.  Coram nobis became a collateral remedy to correct 
fundamental errors, whether factual or legal.22 
Although the modern contours of coram nobis are 
broader than at common law, the writ is still limited to 
                                                 
17 See, e.g., Dewey v. Smith, 230 N.W. 180, 180-81 (Mich. 
1930) (coram vobis had become obsolete due to statutory 
methods of correcting errors); Boyd v. Smyth, 205 N.W. 522, 
523-24 (Iowa 1925) (coram nobis was abolished when omitted 
in revised statute); State v. Hayslip, 107 N.E. 335 (Ohio 1914) 
(finding that common law writs and pleas are defined by 
statute). 
18 Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (1946) (effective Mar. 19, 1948). 
19 See United States v. Mayer, 235 U.S. 55, 69 (1914). 
20 See Randall, supra note 6, at 1067 n.26. 
21 See id. at 1067-68. 
22 David Wolitz, The Stigma of Conviction: Coram Nobis, Civil 
Disabilities, and the Right to Clear One’s Name, 2009 BYU L. 
REV. 1277, 1286-87 (2009). 
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“‘extraordinary’ cases presenting circumstances compelling its 
use ‘to achieve justice.’”  United States v. Denedo, 556 U.S. 
904, 910-11 (2009) (quoting Morgan, 346 U.S. at 510).  Coram 
nobis may not issue if alternative remedies, such as habeas 
corpus, are available.  Denedo, 556 U.S. at 911; United States 
v. Rhines, 640 F.3d 69, 71 (3d Cir. 2011).  28 U.S.C. § 2255 
provides a means to vacate, set aside, or correct a conviction, 
yet it does not apply if a defendant is no longer in custody.  As 
a residual and interstitial remedy, coram nobis can fill that gap.  
It provides a means to challenge a federal conviction where a 
party who is no longer in custody for purposes of § 2255 faces 
continuing consequences as a result of being convicted.  
Rhines, 640 F.3d at 71; United States v. Baptiste, 223 F.3d 188, 
189 (3d Cir. 2000); Chaidez, 568 U.S. at 345 n.1; United States 
v. Stoneman, 870 F.2d 102, 105-06 (3d Cir. 1989).   
“[T]he standard for obtaining [coram nobis] is more 
stringent than that applicable on direct appeal or in habeas 
corpus” in recognition of judicial interests in finality and 
efficiency.  Rhines, 640 F.3d at 71; Stoneman, 870 F.2d at 106.  
Accordingly, coram nobis relief is limited and seeks out error 
of the most fundamental character—the kind that renders the 
proceeding itself irregular and invalid.  Mayer, 235 U.S. at 69; 
see also Morgan, 346 U.S. at 511 (“[R]eview should be 
allowed through this extraordinary remedy only under 
circumstances compelling such action to achieve justice.”); 
Stoneman, 870 F.2d at 106 (“The error must go to the 
jurisdiction of the trial court, thus rendering the trial itself 
invalid.”).  “An error which could be remedied by a new trial, 
such as an error in jury instructions, does not normally come 
within the writ,” Stoneman, 870 F.2d at 106 (citing Mayer, 235 
U.S. at 69 and United States v. Gross, 614 F.2d 365, 368 (3d 
Cir. 1980)), and it is presumed that the prior proceedings were 
properly conducted.  The petitioner has the burden to show 
otherwise.  Morgan, 346 U.S. at 512; United States v. Cariola, 
323 F.2d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 1963).  This means that “it is 
difficult to conceive of a situation in a federal criminal case 
today where [a writ of coram nobis] would be necessary or 
appropriate.” Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416, 429 
(1996) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted). 
A distillation of our caselaw establishes five 
prerequisites for coram nobis relief: the petitioner (1) is no 
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longer in custody; (2) suffers continuing consequences from 
the purportedly invalid conviction; (3) provides sound reasons 
for failing to seek relief earlier; (4) had no available remedy at 
the time of trial; and (5) asserted error(s) of a fundamental kind.  
See Mendoza v. United States, 690 F.3d 157, 159 (3d Cir. 
2012); Orocio, 645 F.3d at 634 n.4; Rhines, 640 F.3d at 71; 
Stoneman, 870 F.2d at 105-06.  The government concedes that 
the first two conditions are satisfied.  The last three 
requirements are, however, in dispute.   
A. Sound Reasons for Delay 
Coram nobis reflects the tension that so often exists 
between finality and equity.  While the writ has no rigid time 
limit, our caselaw emphasizes that “[the] ‘sound reason’ 
standard is even stricter than that used to evaluate § 2255 
petitions” because habeas is generally the exclusive means to 
collaterally challenge a federal conviction or sentence.23  See 
Mendoza, 690 F.3d at 159. 
A defendant seeking to avoid the collateral 
consequences of a conviction cannot postpone seeking relief 
until it appears that a collateral consequence is imminent.  Still, 
coram nobis is a “remedy of last resort.”  Fleming v. United 
States, 146 F.3d 88, 89-90 (2d Cir. 1998).  Consistent with 
these principles, a petitioner is not required to “challenge his 
conviction at the earliest opportunity”; the writ “only requires 
[a petitioner] to have sound reasons for not doing so.”  United 
States v. Kwan, 407 F.3d 1005, 1014 (9th Cir. 2005). 
Yet the more time that elapses between a party’s 
conviction and his petition for coram nobis, the less likely it 
becomes that sound reasons exist.  We have previously found 
delays of less than five years untimely.  See, e.g., Mendoza, 
690 F.3d at 159-60 (four-year delay in bringing ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim was unjustified, even though 
immigration law was unsettled).  Legal ambiguity is also not a 
sound reason for delay.  Id. at 160.  It may be that the diligent 
pursuit of administrative remedies qualifies as a sound reason, 
but we have yet to address that question.  See Kwan, 407 F.3d 
at 1013-14; Kovacs v. United States, 744 F.3d 44, 54 (2d Cir. 
                                                 
23 We do not address whether the failure to pursue § 2255 relief 
constitutes a procedural default barring coram nobis relief. 
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2014).  Given the nature of coram nobis, we must adapt the 
principle of timeliness to the facts before us. 
B. No Available Remedy at the Time of Trial 
We have not previously elaborated on the requirement 
that there was no available remedy at the time of trial, but we 
can say that it focuses on whether a party was unable to make 
certain arguments at trial or on direct appeal.  See Mendoza, 
690 F.3d at 159; Stoneman, 870 F.2d at 106. 
C. Fundamental Error 
The fifth prerequisite is two-pronged: there must be an 
error, and the error must be fundamental.  The identification 
and assertion of “error” is sine qua non of all appellate 
adjudication, but “fundamental error,” within the context of 
coram nobis, is unique.  The term “fundamental” refers to 
“defect[s] which inherently result[] in a complete miscarriage 
of justice.”24  United States v. Woods, 986 F.2d 669, 676 (3d 
Cir. 1993) (quoting Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 346 
(1974)).  Errors that can be remedied through a new trial do not 
usually fall within the writ.  Rhines, 640 F.3d at 71.  Instead, 
the defects must completely undermine the jurisdiction of the 
court, rendering the trial itself invalid.  Id.  Coram nobis is 
therefore generally inappropriate when an alternative remedy 
is available.  Id.  
Because a new trial can correct faulty jury instructions, 
such errors will not typically qualify as fundamental.  Id.  
However, instructions that result in a conviction on a charge 
based on activity that is lawful are fundamentally erroneous.  
See Stoneman, 870 F.2d at 105, 107-08; United States v. 
McClelland, 941 F.2d 999, 1002-03 (9th Cir. 1991); United 
States v. Mandel, 862 F.2d 1067, 1075 (4th Cir. 1988).  
Stoneman, a case where the jury heard both correct and 
incorrect instructions, held that “[a]n error in the jury 
instructions—when a valid conviction could have been had 
under different instructions . . .—is not the sort of fundamental 
defect that produces a complete miscarriage of justice.”  870 
F.2d at 108 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. 
Keane, 852 F.2d 199, 205 (7th Cir. 1988)).  Ineffective 
assistance of counsel, by contrast, is normally considered 
                                                 
24 As coram nobis affords an additional layer of review, the 
standard for relief may be higher than for other remedies. 
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“fundamental.”  See United States v. Rad–O–Lite of Phila., 
Inc., 612 F.2d 740, 744 (3d Cir. 1979) (The writ is available to 
“persons not held in custody [to] attack a conviction for 
fundamental defects, such as ineffective assistance of 
counsel.”). 
IV 
On appeal, Ragbir offers numerous reasons why he 
waited nearly ten years25 before seeking a writ of coram 
nobis:26 while incarcerated, a criminal defense attorney told 
him that nothing could be done to challenge his conviction; he 
did not discover his trial attorney’s purported errors until 2006; 
after being taken into immigration custody, he focused on 
challenging his removal rather than his conviction; he was 
exhausting his administrative remedies; his jury instruction 
arguments were unavailable until after 2010’s Skilling decision 
and 2011’s Global-Tech ruling; his ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims were not ripe until after Padilla v. Kentucky in 
2010 and Lafler v. Cooper and Missouri v. Frye in 2012; and 
he promptly filed a coram nobis petition after being informed 
that challenges to his criminal conviction could not be heard 
administratively.  None of these reasons excuse Ragbir’s delay. 
First, this Court does not apply a timeliness standard for 
coram nobis that is forgiving of delay and dilatoriness.  See 
Mendoza, 690 F.3d at 159.  Though Ragbir claims he was 
unaware of the immigration consequences of his sentencing 
stipulation until 2006, from that time forward he knew that the 
underlying conviction needed to be challenged.  Yet he waited 
another six years before taking any action to collaterally 
challenge his conviction.  During those six years, Ragbir chose 
to pursue administrative remedies rather than coram nobis 
relief.  He offers no acceptable explanation for why he did not 
seek both forms of relief concurrently.  Furthermore, Ragbir’s 
pursuit of administrative remedies cannot constitute a sound 
reason for delay since the immigration relief he seeks is 
                                                 
25 Ten years passed from direct appeal in 2002 until his first 
coram nobis petition in 2012. 
26 The government’s timeliness argument does not rely on the 
five years (2012–17) that elapsed between Ragbir’s first coram 
nobis petition and the current iteration.   
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dependent upon a successful collateral challenge to his 
underlying conviction.27 
Second, Ragbir mistakenly believes that his jury instruction 
arguments were unavailable until 2010 and 2011.28  He admits 
that, at the time of his trial, caselaw already existed addressing 
willful blindness and “dishonesty type language.”  He claims, 
however, that our precedent was ambiguous before Skilling and 
Global-Tech.  That claim is unavailing: we have rejected the 
                                                 
27 Ragbir asked the BIA to assess the validity of his conviction, 
but it refused, stating that the issues surrounding his conviction 
needed to be raised in the federal courts.  In re Ravidath 
Lawrence Ragbir, No. A044 248 862 (B.I.A. May 15, 2012). 
28 As to appellate counsel’s failure to raise willful blindness on 
appeal, Ragbir’s opening brief addresses the issue in a single 
footnote.  Footnote seven states in its entirety: 
In 2002, appellate counsel failed to object to the 
improper willful blindness jury instruction, 
despite trial counsel’s preservation of this claim, 
and despite Mr. Ragbir’s insistence that his 
attorney look into the issue of the jury 
instructions. JA125 ¶ 10; JA345. 
We have previously considered one-sentence footnotes 
insufficient to preserve an issue on appeal.  See, e.g., McBride 
v. Superintendent, SCI Houtzdale, 687 F.3d 92, 95 n.5 (3d Cir. 
2012) (“[Petitioner] only references this colloquy in a footnote 
in his opening brief, and therefore has failed even to adequately 
raise the issue before us.”); United States v. DeMichael, 461 
F.3d 414, 417 (3d Cir. 2006) (“An issue is waived unless a 
party raises it in its opening brief, and for those purposes a 
passing reference to an issue will not suffice to bring that issue 
before this court.” (citation omitted)).   
Footnote seven also references two parts of the joint 
appendix.  J.A. 125 ¶ 10 includes a statement from Ragbir’s 
coram nobis affidavit asserting that appellate counsel failed to 
litigate the issue of willful blindness without providing an 
explanation for this failure.  J.A. 345 is a copy of Ragbir’s 
direct appeal brief, containing no arguments addressing willful 
blindness.  Absent from footnote seven is any assertion of 
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.  Any 
ineffectiveness claim regarding appellate counsel is therefore 
waived. 
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notion that ambiguity in the law justifies “a delay in filing a 
coram nobis petition.”29  Mendoza, 690 F.3d at 160.  What 
matters is whether a claim can be reasonably raised.  
                                                 
29 Even if legal ambiguity constituted a sound reason for delay, 
we do not perceive any opacity in our caselaw.  Ragbir argues 
that our caselaw prevented him from addressing willful 
blindness at trial or on appeal because (1) Global-Tech was not 
decided until 2011 and (2) this Circuit did not previously 
recognize the distinction between subjective and objective 
knowledge that Global-Tech articulates.  We disagree.     
Global-Tech did not promulgate a new test; rather, it 
stated already settled law.  563 U.S. at 769 n.9 (citing United 
States v. Stadtmauer, 620 F.3d 238, 257 (3d Cir. 2010)).  
Although Stadtmauer was decided ten years after Ragbir’s 
trial, it cites two examples of Third Circuit precedent 
accurately describing the “subjective awareness” element of 
willful blindness before Ragbir’s direct appeal.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Wert-Ruiz, 228 F.3d 250, 255 (3d Cir. 2000); 
United States v. Caminos, 770 F.2d 361, 365 (3d Cir. 1985) 
(indicating that a willful blindness charge must “make clear 
that the defendant himself was subjectively aware of the high 
probability of the fact in question, and not merely that a 
reasonable man would have been aware of the probability”).   
The “deliberate avoidance” prong was also clear law 
within this Circuit by 1995.  See United States v. Hayden, 64 
F.3d 126, 133 & n.11 (3d Cir. 1995) (finding that knowledge 
can be imputed where a defendant deliberately avoided 
learning a fact but not where a defendant was “merely 
negligent or reckless in failing to realize the unlawfulness of 
his actions”); see also Wert-Ruiz, 228 F.3d at 255.  We perceive 
no ambiguity in our caselaw.  Yet even if a lack of clarity 
existed, Ragbir could have reasonably argued at trial or on 
appeal that the willful blindness instruction was erroneous. 
Ragbir also asserts that he was unable to bring his 
scheme or artifice to defraud claim prior to 2010’s Skilling 
decision, which narrowed honest-services fraud.  However, 
Skilling is inapposite because Ragbir was not convicted under 
an honest-services fraud theory.  And even if he had been, 
Skilling would not be determinative.  Ragbir acknowledges that 
at the time of his trial and appeal caselaw existed criticizing 
“dishonesty type language.”  See, e.g., United States v. 
Panarella, 277 F.3d 678, 698 (3d Cir. 2002).  As a result, 
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Third, Ragbir could have brought his ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims at least six years earlier.  
Counsel’s alleged failures to adequately investigate the loss30 
and obtain expert testimony31 were actionable by 2006, if not 
on direct appeal.  Ragbir could have also raised his affirmative 
misadvice argument by 2006.32  Lafler and Frye do not justify 
                                                 
Ragbir could have reasonably asserted that the scheme or 
artifice to defraud instruction was flawed.  Whether our 
caselaw was still evolving is of no moment: if a claim can be 
reasonably made, then legal ambiguity is not a sound reason 
for delay. 
30 See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690-91 (1984) 
(finding “counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations 
or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular 
investigations unnecessary”). 
31 See, e.g., Jacobs v. Horn, 395 F.3d 92, 109 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(evaluating claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for 
failure to introduce expert testimony); Raley v. Ylst, 470 F.3d 
792, 799-801 (9th Cir. 2006) (addressing whether failure to 
present expert testimony constituted ineffective assistance of 
counsel); Horsley v. Alabama, 45 F.3d 1486, 1493-96 (11th 
Cir. 1995) (determining that failure to present expert 
psychological witness did not amount to ineffective assistance 
of counsel); Spencer v. Murray, 18 F.3d 229, 231-36 (4th Cir. 
1994) (discussing whether failure to secure expert witness was 
ineffective assistance of counsel); Bruns v. Thalacker, 973 
F.2d 625, 628-29 (8th Cir. 1992) (examining whether lack of 
expert testimony constituted ineffective assistance of counsel); 
St. Louis v. Carroll, 429 F. Supp. 2d 701, 710-11 (D. Del. 
2006) (holding that failure to obtain expert testimony was not 
ineffective assistance of counsel); Venezia v. United States, 
884 F. Supp. 919, 923-24 (D.N.J. 1995) (reviewing claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to present expert 
testimony). 
32 Several cases would have supported a pre-Padilla misadvice 
claim.  See, e.g., Kwan, 407 F.3d 1005; United States v. Couto, 
311 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2002); Downs-Morgan v. United States, 
765 F.2d 1534 (11th Cir. 1985); United States v. Shaw, No. 03-
6759, 2004 WL 1858336 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 11, 2004); United 
States v. Khalaf, 116 F. Supp. 2d 210 (D. Mass. 1999). 
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Ragbir’s delay since they adopted previously established law.33  
Thus, sufficient caselaw already existed such that Ragbir could 
have reasonably brought his ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims much earlier.  Mendoza, 690 F.3d at 160.   
Fourth, the allegedly vague “scheme or artifice to 
defraud” instruction was fair game on direct appeal or soon 
afterward.34  In United States v. Panarella, we acknowledged 
that the breadth of the term “fraud” in federal statutes may raise 
concerns regarding “notice of criminality.”  277 F.3d at 698.  
We also observed, in United States v. Leahy, the increasing 
criticism in the courts of the formulation of fraud in federal 
statutes.  445 F.3d 634, 649-51 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing 
Panarella, 277 F.3d at 698; Matter of EDC, Inc., 930 F.2d 
1275, 1281 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v. Holzer, 816 F.2d 
304, 309 (7th Cir. 1987)).  Based on this caselaw, we conclude 
there was no sound reason for failing to raise this issue in 2002 
or 2006. 
Fifth, considerations of finality, judicial efficiency, and 
potential prejudice towards the government—if a new trial or 
re-sentencing is ordered—also counsel against concluding 
there were sound reasons for delay.35  After examining our 
caselaw and the record before us, we conclude that Ragbir had 
the ability to bring all his claims at least six years before his 
                                                 
33 Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 164 (2012) (citing United 
States v. Rodriguez Rodriguez, 929 F.2d 747, 753 n.1 (1st Cir. 
1991) (per curiam); United States v. Gordon, 156 F.3d 376, 
380-381 (2d Cir. 1998) (per curiam); United States v. Day, 969 
F.2d 39, 43-45 (3d Cir. 1992); Beckham v. Wainwright, 639 
F.2d 262, 267 (5th Cir. 1981); Julian v. Bartley, 495 F.3d 487, 
498-500 (7th Cir. 2007); Wanatee v. Ault, 259 F.3d 700, 703-
704 (8th Cir. 2001); Nunes v. Mueller, 350 F.3d 1045, 1052-
1053 (9th Cir. 2003); Williams v. Jones, 571 F.3d 1086, 1094-
1095 (10th Cir. 2009) (per curiam); United States v. Gaviria, 
116 F.3d 1498, 1512-1514 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (per curiam)). 
34 Contrary to Ragbir’s assertion, there was a remedy available 
for his vagueness claims on direct review.  See Panarella, 277 
F.3d at 698. 
35 Ragbir, who has already served his sentence, does not 
address how a new trial or resentencing, which could 
theoretically result in an increased penalty, would comport 
with the double jeopardy clause. 
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2012 petition for coram nobis.  He provides no sound reason 
for his delay. 
V 
 Coram nobis is an extraordinary remedy, available only 
when all its conditions have been met.36  Ragbir’s claims fail 
to satisfy at least one necessary requirement.37  Accordingly, 
we will affirm the District Court’s denial of the petition.  
                                                 
36 In some circumstances, overlap may exist between the coram 
nobis elements of “sound reasons for delay” and “no available 
remedy at the time of trial.”  While Ragbir lacks “sound 
reasons” for his delay, many of his claims also fail to satisfy 
the “no available remedy at the time of trial” requirement. 
The lack of expert testimony at trial could have been 
raised on appeal.  See supra note 31.   Similarly, Ragbir’s 
vagueness claim could likely have been brought on direct 
review.  See Panarella, 277 F.3d at 698.  We have also already 
concluded that Ragbir’s willful blindness and scheme or 
artifice to defraud claims were available at the time of trial.  See 
supra note 29.  
37 In addition to a lack of “sound reasons for delay,” we fail to 
see any claim that constitutes a “fundamental error.” 
